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Abstract: This paper presents an unspoken aspect of Head of State immunity, namely that such immunity 
is at odds with the expectation that international law should be applied to challenge resistance to and 
promote respect for human rights. It considers the question of whether Head of State immunity gives rise 
to de facto impunity in the case of violations of human rights recognised as peremptory norms (jus cogens) 
committed by such Heads of State. While this paper emphasises the critical role of Head of State immunity 
in the context of international relations, it argues that Heads of State should not exempt from punishment 
when violations of those human rights are at stake. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
State officials have traditionally been immune from the jurisdiction of foreign 
States’ courts when they would otherwise be required to account for the deeds they are 
accused of committing. However, this authoritative principle of international law 
becomes contentious in cases involving the violation of human rights recognised as 
peremptory norms, most strongly represented by the growth of international human rights 
law and the establishment of international tribunals and courts determined to end 
impunity for violations of those human rights, irrespective of the perpetrators’ official 
position.1 Increasing concern for international human rights and greater international 
support for abolishing impunity for violators of those human rights have led the 
international community to question the boundaries of Head of State immunity. 
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1 Hazel Fox QC and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 
537. 
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There were great expectations that international law would evolve in favour of 
international human rights after the Second World War. These expectations undoubtedly 
continue. It would be a fantasy to imagine that international law always works in favour 
of human rights; however, there is a definite trend within the international community to 
seek to enhance and support international human rights. Head of State immunity appears 
to be a considerable impediment to realising the expectation that international law can be 
used to challenge resistance to respect for human rights and to ending impunity. In this 
sense, impunity ‘must be distinguished from immunity; the two terms must not be used 
interchangeably’.2 Immunity is a general rule of international law ‘whereby certain State 
officials are deemed to be endowed with immunity from criminal prosecution and civil 
suits initiated in foreign States. Impunity can be described as exemption from penalty or 
punishment. When the sovereign immunity principle is applied to the practice of 
sovereign impunity, individuals, who have administrated and participated in fundamental 
human rights violations, are often beyond the capacity of the law to provide a remedy’.3 
 
This paper examines the tension between the principle of Head of State immunity 
and the protection of human rights recognised as peremptory norms under general 
international law. It considers the developments under international law in respect of the 
rules regarding such immunity. This paper subsequently discusses and analyses immunity 
and impunity for Heads of State when violations of human rights recognised as 
peremptory norms are perpetrated. To engage with this discussion, the paper concentrates 
on the judgement of the International Court of Justice in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) so as to criticise the issue of immunity in 
question. Towards that end, the paper considers the question of whether Head of State 
immunity, in effect, means Head of State impunity in cases involving the violation of 
human rights recognised as peremptory norms. Here, the central aim of the paper is to 
argue that Head of State immunity leads to de facto impunity in the case of violations of 
those human rights. Finally, regarding the language of this paper, when the phrase 
fundamental human rights is used, it signifies or reads as human rights recognised as 
peremptory norms of general international law.4 
 
 
                                                          
2 Selman Ozdan, ‘Immunity vs. Impunity in International Law: A Human Rights Approach’ (2018) 4 Baku 
State University Law Review 36, 52. 
3 ibid 42. See also generally Jacques Fomerand, Historical Dictionary of Human Rights (Rowman & 
Littlefield 2014); Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, ‘Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on 
the Role of Judicial Prosecutions’ in Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Petrus Adrianus Maria Malcontent (eds), 
From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States 
(United Nations University Press 2004). 
4 Human rights recognised as peremptory norms includes the prohibitions against slavery or slave trade; 
genocide; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; murder or disappearance 
of individuals; systematic racial discrimination; prolonged arbitrary detention; and the principles of the 
United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force. See Yousuf v Samantar (2012) 699 F 3d 763 (Court of 
Appeals, 4th Circuit) 775–76; Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, ‘A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens’ 
(2009) 34 Yale Journal of International Law 331. 
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II. DEVELOPMENTS OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
The concept of Head of State immunity was explicitly and conceptually located 
in the 1987 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe No. 770, in which the US Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit stated that Head of State immunity ‘is a doctrine of customary 
international law. Generally speaking, the doctrine maintains that a head of state is 
immune from the jurisdiction of a foreign state’s courts, at least as to authorised official 
acts taken while the ruler is in power’.5 
 
In simple terms, the principle of immunity has been instituted to protect a State 
and its senior officials from being sued before its courts and particularly foreign courts, 
so that they can carry out their activities abroad without impediment. Since immunity 
from prosecution and execution is based upon the sovereign equality principle of States, 
this principle does not prevent senior State officials from being indicted before an 
international court as long as this court is vested in jurisdiction over serving or former 
Heads of State.6 
 
Prior to 1919, there was little discussion of immunity for Heads of State before 
international tribunals or courts, as the issue had been all but taboo with regard to any 
waiver of such immunity. However, the Versailles Treaty, which is generally accepted as 
the first indictment of a former Head of State before an international tribunal, is seen by 
many as breaking this taboo. On this point, Article 227 of the Treaty reads as follows: 
 
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern 
[The Kaiser], formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against 
international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be 
constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the 
rights of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the 
following powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, 
Italy and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives 
of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of 
international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its 
duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. The Allied and 
Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands 
for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.7 
                                                          
5 In re Grand Jury Proceedings [1987] United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 700, 1108 817 F2d 
1111. For a private visit to another State, Sir Arthur Watts stated that although ‘it may well be that a Head 
of State, when on a private visit to another State, still enjoys certain privileges and immunities, it is much 
less likely that the same is true of heads of governments and foreign ministers. Although they may be 
accorded certain special treatment by the host State, this is more likely to be a matter of courtesy and respect 
for the seniority of the visitor, than a reflection of any belief that such a treatment is required by international 
law’. Sir Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Governments 
and Foreign Ministers, vol 247 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994) 109.  
6 Brigitte Stern, ‘Immunities for Heads of State: Where Do We Stand?’ in Mark Lattimer and Philippe 
Sands (eds), Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (Hart Publishing 2003). 
7 Peace Treaty of Versailles 1919 Article 227. 
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However, the Kaiser was never tried. Before Armistice Day, the Kaiser fled to the 
Netherlands and asylum was granted to him by the Dutch government who refused to 
hand him over for trial.8 After the Treaty of Versailles, the issue of immunity for Heads 
of State was challenged through the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international 
military tribunals. Article 7 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal declared that the 
‘official position of defendants, whether heads of state or responsible officials in 
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment’.9 A number of significant developments in international law have 
taken place whose outcome has been to restrict Head of State immunity in the interest of 
securing and maintaining fundamental human rights. The Nuremberg Principles include 
the assertion that the ‘fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime 
under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does 
not relieve him from responsibility under international law’.10 In a similar vein, Article 6 
of the Statute of the Tokyo Tribunal declared that: 
 
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused 
acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be 
sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is 
charged.11   
 
In respect of both statements by international military tribunals, international law 
unequivocally protects State officials and provides immunity; however, in particular 
circumstances immunity for Heads of State cannot be invoked if his or her deeds 
constitute a violation of fundamental human rights. If violations of those human rights 
are at stake, the official position of a Head of State should not serve as a shield to avoid 
punishment. Immunity should apply only to sovereign acts; therefore, Heads of State 
should not enjoy functional immunity in relation to violations of fundamental human 
rights. Functional immunity provides protection for sovereign acts; however, acts which 
cause fundamental human rights violations should not be deemed as sovereign acts.12   
 
Concerning individual criminal responsibility, it is clear that the statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda are considered important developments in terms of clarifying the 
position of Head of State immunity in relation to international crimes that give rise to 
fundamental human rights violations. Both statutes emphasise that Heads of State should 
not benefit from immunity. Article 7(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides that the ‘official position of any accused 
                                                          
8 See Gary D Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 74. 
9 ‘Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1 - Charter of the International Military Tribunal’ Article 7. 
10 ‘Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316’ Principle 3. 
11 ‘International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter’ (1946) Article 6. 
12 RA Kolodkin, ‘Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 62nd 
Session’ (International Law Commission 2010) UN Doc. A/CN.4/631 para 28, 29, 30 and 31; Dapo Akande 
and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’ 
(2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 815. 
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person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, 
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment’.13 Article 
6(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda reiterates this 
statement. In so doing, this provision acknowledges that perpetrators of human rights 
violations, regardless of their official position, cannot hide behind the shield of immunity; 
and that Heads of State enjoy no impunity. Furthermore, in the case of Prosecutor v 
Blaskic, the Appeal Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal highlighted that: 
 
The general rule under discussion is well established in international law and is 
based on the sovereign equality of States (par in parem non habet imperium). The 
few exceptions relate to one particular consequence of the rule. These exceptions 
arise from the norms of international criminal law prohibiting war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. Under these norms, those responsible for such 
crimes cannot invoke immunity from national or international jurisdiction even if 
they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their official capacity.14 
In a similar vein, Article 27 of the Rome Statute embodies provisions which 
indicate that the Statute applies to all individuals regardless of their official position 
within a State: 
 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, 
a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility 
under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence. 
 
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.15 
 
The essential purpose of the incorporation of these provisions into the Rome 
Statute and ad hoc tribunals is to ensure individual criminal responsibility for all persons, 
and particularly Heads of State, who perpetrate violations of fundamental human rights 
which constitute international crimes. Furthermore, by ensuring individual criminal 
responsibility, those provisions prevent certain persons from using their official position 
as a shield against prosecution for those human rights violations. 
 
Article 98(1) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court goes beyond States 
party to the Statute. Article 98(1), which is concerned with cooperation with respect to 
the waiver of immunity and consent to surrender, reads as follows: 
                                                          
13 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, SC res. 
827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 1993 Article 7(2). 
14 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic [1997] 110 ILR 687 (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia) 710. 
15 ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (UN General Assembly 2002) Article 27(1),(2). 
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The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that 
third State for the waiver of the immunity.16 
 
Articles 27 and 98(1) of the Rome Statute might be seen as contradictory in that 
the former rejects immunities while the latter endorses immunities. However, article 
98(1) addresses a particular situation in which a State party to the Statute is required to 
surrender a person who is jurisdictionally untouchable by virtue of the immunities granted 
by a third State. In this sense, this case can be described as an equation with three knowns 
(a State Party, the Statute, and a person endowed with immunities), although it would 
appear that the equation always produces a tangled outcome for the State to whom the 
request is made. Specifically, the State Party to the Statute either must breach its 
obligation to meet the requirements of the Court or must breach its commitment to abide 
by immunities of a State that is not party to the Statute. The interaction between Articles 
27 and 98(1) of the Statute thereby establishes a system wherein the State Parties to the 
Statute consent to surrender all immunity rights in relation to the Court’s requirements 
regarding their own State officials or representatives, while still abiding by the 
immunities of States that are not yet party to the Statute.17  
 
Ultimately, Article 98(1) of the Statute implies three situations where the 
immunities bestowed on a person by a State that is not a party to the Statute can be 
trumped. First, if a State that is not a party to the Statute agrees to relinquish the immunity, 
the person can be prosecuted. Second, if the State official is no longer in office, the 
official’s personal immunity ends (although functional immunity can still be enjoyed), 
thus enabling the official to be prosecuted for committed violations of human rights. 
Third, if the United Nations Security Council requests full participation under Chapter 
VII, the State which is not a party to the Statute automatically is deprived of its immunity 
rights, and must surrender the accused.18 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 ibid Article 98(1). 
17 See for detailed analyses on the interplay of Articles 27 and 98(1) of the International Criminal Court 
Statute Paola Gaeta, ‘Official Capacity and Immunities’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD 
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol I (Oxford University 
Press 2002); Dapo Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and Its Impact on 
Al Bashir’s Immunities’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 333.  
18 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 556. For the relationship between the International Criminal Court and 
UN Security Council with regards to the issue of waiving immunity, see Akande (n 17); Cryer and others 
549–557.  
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III. THE PROBLEM OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN RELATION TO 
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS RECOGNISED AS PEREMPTORY NORMS 
 
In international law, a number of prominent decisions have bearing on the tension 
between vesting immunity in the Head of State and the protection of human rights 
recognised as peremptory norms.19 In analysing Head of State immunity in the context of 
human rights violations, the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v Belgium) case is important, particularly in relation to the question of whether 
or not Head of State immunity equates to Head of State impunity in such cases. Heads of 
State sometimes enjoy considerable leeway to escape from proceedings in respect of 
human rights violations. In this sense, the concept of immunity is sometimes ‘wrongfully 
utilised to signify that a person benefits from impunity or is not prosecuted, for reasons 
other than the technical legal bar of immunity’.20 
 
That said, the perspective of the International Court of Justice for Mr Yerodia 
raises the issue of immunity or impunity for Heads of State when violations of 
fundamental human rights are perpetrated. In the Arrest Warrant case, Belgium argued 
that immunities accorded to incumbent Foreign Affairs Ministers cannot, under any 
circumstances, provide the minister with protection where he or she is suspected of having 
perpetrated violations of fundamental human rights. Subsequently, Belgium touched 
upon the question of whether a person’s high-level status within a State constitutes an 
impediment to prosecution. On this point, Belgium claimed that the official position of a 
person should not be an obstacle to applying jurisdiction. On 11 April 2000, an 
international arrest warrant was issued by a Belgian investigating judge of the Brussels 
Tribunal of First Instance against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in respect of alleged crimes 
against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law. Mr Yerodia was 
accused of having made some speeches that incited racial hatred and occasioned the 
massacre of Tutsi civilians in 1998. Mr Yerodia was charged by the Belgian judge with 
grave breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of their Additional 
Protocols I and II of 1977. The arrest warrant for Mr Yerodia was transferred to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and concurrently circulated at the international level 
                                                          
19 Strictly speaking, the suit against the former President of Chile Augusto Pinochet by the UK House of 
Lords in 1998 and 1999 was a significant in international law as Pinochet could not claim immunity for 
acts of torture for which he was responsible. Although it might have been ruled on narrow grounds, this 
important decision appears to have marked the end of immunity in cases involving violations of 
fundamental human rights by a former Head of State, even when those violations were committed while 
the Head of State was in office. Michael Tunks, ‘Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-
of-State Immunity’ (2002) 52 Duke Law Journal 651, 659; Ingrid Wuerth, ‘Pinochet’s Legacy Reassessed’ 
(2012) 106 The American Journal of International Law 731; see Charles Pierson, ‘Pinochet and the End of 
Immunity: England’s House of Lords Holds That a Former Head of State Is Not Immune for Torture’ (2000) 
14 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 263. For the Pinochet decision see R v Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 1) (1998) 4 AII ER (House 
of Lords); R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 
2) (1999) 2 W.L.R. 272 (House of Lords); R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, 
ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) (2000) 1 A.C. 147 (House of Lords). 
20 Stern (n 6) 81. 
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via Interpol. Ultimately, Belgian authorities brought a suit against Mr Yerodia based on 
the Belgian Law of 16 June 1993, concerning the punishment of grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, which provides a basis for universal 
jurisdiction in regard to such violations. Article 5(3) of the Belgian Law also provides 
that the immunity enjoyed by a person who acts in an official capacity does not create 
any obstacle to the application of the law.21 
 
On 17 October 2000, the Democratic Republic of the Congo filed an application 
with the International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against the Belgian 
Kingdom in relation to the case involving this international arrest warrant. In making the 
Application, the Democratic Republic of the Congo relied on two legal grounds. First, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo asserted that Belgium had violated its obligation to 
respect the immunity of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State. Second, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo alleged that Belgium had breached the principle that 
a State cannot exercise its authority over another State’s territory and the principle of 
sovereign equality of States. On this point, the Democratic Republic of the Congo claimed 
that the ‘universal jurisdiction that the Belgian State attributes to itself under Article 7 of 
the law in question’ does not comply with the principle of sovereign equality. The heart 
and soul of the argument of the Democratic Republic of the Congo concerned the 
violation of customary international rule in relation to the absolute immunity and 
inviolability of incumbent Foreign Ministers from criminal jurisdiction. Arguing that 
Belgium had infringed the sovereign equality principle of States, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo requested that the International Court of Justice require Belgium 
to declare its international arrest warrant null and void.22 The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo insisted that Belgium had no jurisdiction under international law to issue and 
circulate an international arrest warrant, and that by doing so it had breached the rights of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo to perform and conduct its foreign affairs through 
its foreign minister.23  
 
Belgium pointed to the decision rendered on 24 March 1999 by the House of Lords 
in the United Kingdom in relation to the former head of State of Chile, General Augusto 
Pinochet Duarte, which recognised and accepted an exception to the principle of 
immunity in respect of violations of fundamental human rights under international law. 
                                                          
21 See the Judgment of Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
(2002) I.C.J. Reports; See generally Matthias Goldmann, ‘Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v Belgium)’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL) (Oxford 
University Press 2009); see for the mentioned article Belgium: Act of 1999 Concerning the Punishment of 
Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law 1999. 
22 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [1, 21, and 
62]. Article 7 of the Act of 1999 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International 
Humanitarian Law is about competence, applicable procedure and the execution of sentences. It states that 
the ‘Belgian courts shall be competent to deal with breaches provided for in the present Act, irrespective of 
where such breaches have been committed’. Belgium: Act of 1999 Concerning the Punishment of Grave 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (n 21). 
23 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21); see also 
Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium)’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 677. 
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According to Belgium, the holding in the Pinochet No 3 case advanced the 
development of international law by acknowledging an important exception to the 
principle of immunity for Heads of State or Government.24 Belgium accordingly referred 
to a statement by Lord Millett that international law ‘cannot be supposed to have 
established a crime having the character of a jus cogens and at the same time to have 
provided an immunity which is co-extensive with the obligation it seeks to impose’. 
Belgium also cited the words of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers that ‘no established 
rule of international law requires state immunity ratione materiae to be accorded in 
respect of prosecution for an international crime’.25 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo, following Belgium’s argument 
concerning the Pinochet decision, emphasised that according to international law as it 
currently stands, there was no basis for any exception to the principle of Head of State 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction for a standing Minister of Foreign Affairs where she 
or he is accused of having perpetrated fundamental human rights violations under 
international law. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, by cross-referencing the 
Pinochet decision, emphasised Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s statement that this ‘immunity 
enjoyed by a head of state in power and an ambassador in post is a complete immunity 
attached to the person of the head of state or ambassador and rendering him immune from 
all actions or prosecutions whether or not they relate to matters done for the benefit of the 
state’.26 Here, the focus is on whether the accused is an incumbent or a former Head of 
State rather than the gravity of their alleged crimes. The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo argued that the immunity ‘accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs when in office 
covers all their acts, including any committed before they took office, and that it is 
irrelevant whether the acts done whilst in office may be characterized or not as official 
acts’.27 
 
The International Court of Justice examined the decision of the House of Lords in 
the Pinochet case but found that there was no applicable exception to the rule of Head of 
State immunity from criminal jurisdiction; moreover, it found that current Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs are particularly inviolable where they are suspected of having perpetrated 
violations of fundamental human rights. Accordingly, the Court rejected the Belgian 
argument in relation to the Pinochet decision by the House of Lords.28 
 
Belgium’s approach in the Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium case can 
be regarded as an important step towards the objective of abolishing impunity for 
perpetrators of fundamental human rights violations. On this point, Belgium pointed out 
that: 
                                                          
24 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [56]. 
25 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (n 
19) 278 and 289; see also Reed Brody and Michael Ratner (eds), The Pinochet Papers: The Case of Augusto 
Pinochet Ugarte in Spain and Britain (Kluwer Law International 2000) 346. 
26 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (n 
19) 201–202. 
27 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [47]. 
28 ibid 58–59. 
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[W]hile Ministers for Foreign Affairs in office generally enjoy an immunity from 
jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign State, such immunity applies only to acts 
carried out in the course of their official functions, and cannot protect such persons 
in respect of private acts or when acting otherwise than in the performance of their 
official functions.29 
 
The International Court of Justice stated that it is bound ‘to find that, given the 
nature and purpose of the warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr Yerodia 
enjoyed as the [Democratic Republic of] the Congo’s incumbent Minister for Foreign 
Affairs’. The Court therefore decided that the warrant issue led to a violation of Belgium’s 
obligation towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that Belgium failed to 
respect Head of State immunity. According to the Court, Belgium also breached the 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction under international law.30 It follows that the principle 
of immunity for an incumbent Head of State is still prevalent and alive, even in respect 
of violations of fundamental human rights prohibited under international law. In respect 
of the distinction between immunity and impunity bestowed on Heads of State, the 
International Court of Justice underscored that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by 
Heads of State in power does not mean that they can benefit from impunity with reference 
to any violations they may have perpetrated, regardless of their seriousness. ‘Immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate 
concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility 
is a question of substantive law’. The Court added that while jurisdictional immunity may 
become an obstacle to prosecution for definite offences or for a definite period, ‘it cannot 
exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility’.31  
 
The Court implied that the immunities provided by international law for a current 
or former Head of State do not constitute an impediment to criminal prosecution in 
particular circumstances. Subsequently, the Court observed four exceptional situations to 
Head of State immunity under international law. Although the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice implied that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by 
Heads of State does not equate to impunity for international crimes, the exceptions to 
Head of State immunity outlined by the Court become insufficient to abolish impunity. 
 
First, the Court stated that a Head of State does not enjoy immunity under 
international law from criminal proceedings in his/her own country’s courts. Second, the 
Court held that Heads of State should be deprived of jurisdictional immunity before a 
foreign State’s court if the State which they represent waives their immunity rights.32 
 
Regarding the aforementioned two exceptional situations, prosecution requires ‘a 
willingness of the State which appointed the person as a Foreign Minister to investigate 
and prosecute allegations against him domestically or to lift immunity in order to allow 
                                                          
29 ibid 49. 
30 ibid 70. 
31 ibid 60. 
32 ibid 61; for further analysis see Stern (n 6). 
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another State to do the same’.33 Be that as it may, where domestic authorised bodies do 
not consent to open an investigation or start a prosecution, the committed violations of 
human rights will go unpunished. Such an outcome raises the issue of impunity.   
 
The third exception the Court identified was that after a person’s official position 
as a Minister for Foreign Affairs ends, he or she can no longer benefit from the immunities 
granted by international law in foreign States. ‘Provided that it has jurisdiction under 
international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of 
office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private 
capacity’.34   
 
The last exception identified by the Court was that neither former nor incumbent 
Heads of State enjoy immunity when that immunity has been limited by a treaty 
establishing an international court. Afterwards, the International Court of Justice listed 
the International Criminal Court as one such tribunal which may overturn the immunity 
of a Head of State provided that it has jurisdiction under international law.35 The 
jurisdiction of the Court arises from the authority vested by the contracting States in the 
Statute of the Court or via the United Nations Security Council. As Michael Tunks noted, 
‘no other country has jurisdiction over a third party’s head of state, and, consequently, no 
two states may agree by treaty to waive the immunity of a third party’s head of state 
without that other nation’s consent’.36 It follows that the alleged jurisdiction of the court’s 
statute over a Head of State whose home State does not assent to the statute is not 
sufficient to rectify customary international law and protect fundamental human rights 
from Head of State impunity. 
 
It would be untenable to claim that in the absence of the International Criminal 
Court, a Head of State who is suspected of having committed violations of fundamental 
human rights would be justiciable solely before his or her own State’s courts. 
 
IV. PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS VS. HEAD OF STATE 
IMPUNITY 
 
With respect to the peremptory nature of fundamental human rights, the decision 
by the International Court of Justice offers no clear or plain solution to the tension 
between Head of State immunity and protection of fundamental human rights. The 
                                                          
33 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [35] [Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
34 ibid 61; see for comments on the third exception of the Court Antonio Cassese, ‘When May Senior State 
Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 
European Journal of International Law 853, 867–68. 
35 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [61]. 
36 See Tunks (n 19) 665; see also generally Madeline Morris, ‘The Democratic Dilemma of the International 
Criminal Court’ (2002) 5 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 591; see generally Cassese (n 34). ‘The 
International Criminal Court will only be able to act if States which have jurisdiction are unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out investigation or prosecution’. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [37] [Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
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Judgment undermined the argument that the principle of protection of fundamental 
human rights becomes hierarchically superior to immunity norms; if it were, immunity 
would be obtainable neither by States nor by current or former Heads of State.37  
 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium case, Judge ad hoc Van den 
Wyngaert, in her Dissenting Opinion, claimed that there were no grounds in positive 
international law for bestowing full immunity on incumbent Heads of State against 
foreign criminal jurisdiction. She emphasised that neither State practice nor opinio juris 
constitutes an international custom that affects the Court’s decision.38 It follows that there 
is no treaty or legal opinion that supports the proposition of the Court. International law 
does not provide immunity to incumbent Heads of State from criminal proceedings when 
they perpetrate violations of fundamental human rights. In this sense, Belgium’s act might 
seem to be at odds with international comity; however that act did not breach an 
international legal obligation. Judge Wyngaert then stated that:  
 
[T[he Court’s conclusion is reached without regard to the general tendency toward 
the restriction of immunity of the State officials (including even Heads of State), 
not only in the field of private and commercial law where the par in parem 
principle has become more and more restricted and deprived of its mystique, but 
also in the field of criminal law, when there are allegations of serious international 
crimes.39 
 
It must be noted that the international arrest warrant was issued by Belgium in 
respect of accusations of war crimes which the International Court of Justice failed to 
mention. It is important to ask what is required under international law and what 
international law permits States, as members of international society, to do when their 
officials are accused of violations of fundamental human rights. In this sense, two 
particular interests are reflected in contemporary international law: first, the demand for 
international accountability for having allegedly committed violations of fundamental 
human rights and second, the sovereign equality principle of States which is regarded as 
a prerequisite for immunities.40  
 
Redressing the balance between these two particular interests is important for 
resolving the contradiction between Head of State immunity and protection of 
fundamental human rights. The Court, instead of redressing the balance, considered a 
very narrow question on the immunities of incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs. By 
doing so, the Court ‘has missed an excellent opportunity to contribute to the development 
of modern international criminal law’.41 
                                                          
37 See Wuerth (n 19) 741. 
38 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [1, 10, and 23] 
[Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]; see also Petra Minnerop and others, World Court Digest 
2001 - 2005, vol 4 (Springer Science & Business Media 2009). 
39 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [23] [Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
40 ibid 5 [Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
41 ibid 6 [Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
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The International Court of Justice, in the Arrest Warrant case, recognised that a 
former and incumbent Foreign Affairs Minister ‘might be subject to criminal proceedings 
before certain international criminal courts where they have jurisdiction’.42 The Court 
specifically cited the International Criminal Court as an example. 
 
This issue was indeed raised before the International Criminal Court in respect of 
an arrest warrant for the incumbent President of the Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-
Bashir. When, on 4 March 2009 and 12 July 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the 
International Criminal Court issued two warrants of arrest for Omar al Bashir for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, his arrest was required in accordance with the Rome 
Statute.43 Omar Al-Bashir was suspected of being criminally responsible as an indirect 
violator, or co-perpetrator, for the liable person in respect of the crime of genocide.44  
Since the arrest warrants were issued, President Al-Bashir has travelled to several 
countries, including the Republic of Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, the Republic of Chad, 
South Africa. Although those countries are State parties to the Rome Statute and hence 
were obligated to arrest him, he has never been arrested.45 
 
On 15 February 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the Court ‘requested the Registry 
to send Notes Verbales to the Republic of Chad and the State of Libya, enquiring about 
said visit, and reminding the former of its obligations with respect to the arrest and 
surrender of Omar Al-Bashir to the Court’. Al Bashir travelled to Chad to attend a summit 
and departed from Chad; however, the Chadian Government took no measure to arrest 
him. The international community called on Chad to abide by the obligations decided 
upon by the Court regarding the arrest warrant for Al Bashir and the Government of Chad 
was required to provide information to the Chamber about Al Bashir’s alleged journey. 
On 26 March 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued that Chad had failed to cooperate with 
the International Criminal Court and indicated the non-compliance of Chad to the 
obligations of the Security Council.46 Al-Bashir also attended the African Union summit 
scheduled from 7 to 15 June 2015 in South Africa. On 13 June 2015, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II asserted that the Republic of South Africa had an obligation to arrest and surrender Al-
Bashir. South Africa failed to arrest him. On 15 October 2015, upon South Africa’s 
request, Pre-Trial Chamber II extended the deadline to submit a report regarding the 
failure of the South African Government to arrest Al-Bashir.47        
 
In respect of the jurisdiction, the Pre-Trial Chamber declared that the official 
position of Al-Bashir as Head of State did not free him from appearing before the 
                                                          
42 Fox QC and Webb (n 1) 558. 
43 The Prosecutor v Al Bashir, First Arrest Warrant [2009] ICC-02/05-01/09 (Pre-Trial Chamber I); The 
Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Second Arrest Warrant [2010] ICC-02/05-01/09-95 (Pre-Trial Chamber I); ‘Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (n 15) Article 58(1)(b). 
44 The Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Second Arrest Warrant (n 43). 
45 Some non-State parties to the Rome Statute were also welcomed Omar Al-Bashir: The Islamic Republic 
of Mauritania, the People’s Republic of China, People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt. See ‘Bashir-Watch’ <http://bashirwatch.org/> accessed 05 July 2018. 
46 The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir (2013) ICC-02/05-01/09-151 (Pre-Trial Chamber II). 
47 The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir (2015) ICC-02/05-01/09-242 (Pre-Trial Chamber II). 
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International Criminal Court. The Chamber proposed four considerations in reaching this 
decision. First, the Chamber emphasised that one of the crucial goals of the Rome Statute 
is to end impunity for perpetrators of violations of international crimes which amount to 
human rights violations. Second, the Chamber noted that Article 27 of the Statute must 
be applied to achieve this goal. This provision makes immunity non-applicable and 
enforces the criminal responsibility of all persons regardless of their official capacity in 
a State. Third, as required by Article 21 of the Rome Statute, other sources of law can be 
applied only if there is a gap in the Rome Statute that cannot be filled by interpreting the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties with respect to internationally accepted 
human rights norms. Fourth, the United Nations Security Council has accepted that the 
investigation into the situation in Sudan and any prosecution generated therefrom will be 
compatible with the Statutory framework of the International Court of Justice.48 On this 
point, Dapo Akande stated that ‘the nature of the Charter as a sort of constitutional 
document, and […] obligations under the Charter ought to be regarded as taking priority 
over the customary international law’.49 
 
Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute; however, the United Nations 
Security Council, in referring the case in Darfur to the International Criminal Court, made 
reference to Article 13(b) of the Statute. Subsequently, the Council required that Sudan 
should co-operate with the Court.50 Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the 
Security Council possesses full authority to take measures in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and to maintain and restore international security. By 
becoming a member of the United Nations, the Sudanese Government gives implicit 
consent to the Security Council for the abolition of Head of State immunity, because 
Article 25 of the Charter requires Member States to accept and execute the decisions of 
the Council. It follows that immunity for Al-Bashir before the courts of foreign States has 
been implicitly abolished. It must be noted that abolishing immunity in relation to the 
accusations in the Al-Bashir case conforms with the Security Council’s objective, which 
is to avoid absolute impunity for perpetrators of fundamental human rights violations that 
pose a threat to international security and peace.51  
 
International law does not prohibit investigation of alleged violations of human 
rights; in fact, international law supports such inquiries, even if the accused perpetrator 
                                                          
48 See The Prosecutor v Al Bashir, First Arrest Warrant (n 43) at paras. 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45; see also 
Jessica Needham, ‘Protection or Prosecution for Omar Al Bashir? The Changing State of Immunity in 
International Criminal Law’ (2011) 17 Auckland University Law Review 219. 
49 Akande (n 17) 348. 
50 Needham (n 48) 247. 
51 See generally Sophie Papillon, ‘Has the United Nations Security Council Implicitly Removed Al Bashir’s 
Immunity?’ (2010) 10(2) International Criminal Law Review 275. There is another perspective that claims 
that the implicit removal of immunity by the Security Council would be at odds with customary 
international law and treaty principles which provide immunity for serving heads of State. Be that as it may, 
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter reports that in ‘the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Member of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’. For a critique of the 
implicit removal of immunity by the Council see Paola Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity 
from Arrest?’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 315.    
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committed the crime as a State agent in a foreign State.52 This is evident in the history of 
international law, in which there are very significant codifications of the principle of 
individual accountability for violations of fundamental human rights. For example, the 
1950 Nuremberg Principles highlighted that ‘any person who commits an act which 
constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to 
punishment’.53 Likewise, Article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide reads as follows: ‘Persons committing genocide or any of the 
other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’.54 Furthermore, official reports 
and resolutions can be found under the United Nations.55 
 
Prioritising the immunities for Heads of State in cases involving violations of 
fundamental human rights produces a tension between the immunity principle and the 
protection of those human rights. That is to say, the prohibitions against certain violations 
of human rights are deemed as jus cogens in nature, and since jus cogens norms are in no 
case trumped by any other norm, the hierarchy should be established by considering the 
superiority of jus cogens norms. It follows that the protection of fundamental human 
rights takes priority under international law. On this point, it must be noted that where 
violations of fundamental human rights ‘are concerned, immunity cannot block 
investigations or prosecutions [of] such [violations], regardless of whether such 
proceedings are brought before national or before international courts’.56 To protect and 
improve the fundamental values and interests of human beings, the effective prohibition 
of certain violations of human rights has been recognised by the international community 
as having a jus cogens character. It follows that, if this hierarchically superior norm 
becomes at variance with the principles guiding Head of State immunity, it should be 
trumped by those provisions which are designed to defend and maintain fundamental 
human rights.57 
 
                                                          
52 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
53 ‘Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316’ (n 12) Principle 1. 
54 ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Adopted by General Assembly 
of the United Nations’ (United Nations Treaty Series 1948) 78. The acts listed in Article 3 are genocide, 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit 
genocide and complicity in genocide.  
55 See for example United Nations Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Administration of Justice and the 
Human Rights of Detainees, Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil 
and Political) Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 
1996/119’ (1997) UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
‘Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Impunity - Report of the Independent Expert to Update the 
Set of Principles to Combat Impunity by Diane Orentlicher: Addendum - Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity’ (2005) 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. 
56 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) [31] [Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert]. 
57 See generally Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) (n 21) 
[Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh]. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The maintenance of peaceful relations among States requires that Heads of State 
be granted appropriate immunities from jurisdiction before the courts of foreign States. 
For the sake of maintaining an environment in which Heads of State can carry out their 
international duties while visiting foreign countries, Head of State immunity should 
certainly afford protection from criminal responsibility. However, when Heads of State 
are suspected of having committed violations of fundamental human rights, they should 
not be exempt from punishment; in other words, immunity should not amount to 
impunity. At this point, it should be noted that while the doctrine of immunity should be 
maintained, this doctrine should no longer apply to situations in which transgression of 
fundamental human rights recognised as a peremptory norm of general international law 
has occurred. Impunity always ‘presents a challenge to those responsible for preventing 
violations of fundamental human rights and establishing a just society. When impunity is 
allowed, it may become a significant obstacle to justice and peace’.58     
 
Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan reinforced the rationale 
behind Article 27 of the Rome Statute when he asserted that:  
 
in the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal 
justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its 
realisation. We will do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you to do 
yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army 
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of 
distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of 
justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights will be 
punished.59 
 
Head of State immunities are considered to be an essential element of international 
relations and international law. However, they are not jus cogens in nature. The protection 
of fundamental human rights should override these procedural immunities. Political 
concerns may not allow States to waive the immunity of their own high-ranking officials, 
but as Lauterpacht rightly noted, the ‘dignity of a foreign state may suffer more from an 
appeal to immunity than from a denial of it’.60 Immunity from jurisdiction should on no 
account be applicable to fundamental human rights violations under international law 
which meet the threshold of a jus cogens norm, neither before domestic courts nor before 
international courts. Heads of State should not be allowed to enjoy immunities when 
violations of such human rights have been committed. 
 
                                                          
58 Ozdan (n 2) 51. 
59 ‘Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Overview’ (Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 1999) <http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm> accessed 05 July 2018. 
60 H Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’ (1951) 28 British Year 
Book of International Law 220, 232. 
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